The effects of the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) on the Singapore General Hospital's Department of Anaesthesia are described.
In November 2002, reports of atypical pneumonia in China's Guangdong Province emerged. Within weeks, the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) virus responsible had spread far and wide. Alarmingly, healthcare workers were infected while looking after these patients. With the use of full personal protective equipment (PPE), such nosocomial infections decreased markedly.
This article relates the outbreak of SARS in Singapore and its impact on the Singapore General Hospital (SGH), the biggest teaching hospital in the country. How the hospital had to respond to an uncertain and fluid situation provides useful lessons for other hospitals and healthcare workers since any country is at risk. The Department of Anaesthesia implemented administrative, logistic and infection control measures to safeguard the health of anaesthetic staff while continuing to maintain a service under difficult circumstances. Measures taken nationwide to contain and prevent the spread of SARS is outside the scope of this article.
In February 2003, a Chinese doctor suffering from SARS stayed at a hotel in Hong Kong where he infected several guests who brought the disease home to Toronto and Singapore. Three of them were treated in Tan Tock Seng Hospital (TTSH), a major Singapore teaching hospital. By March 15, SARS emerged amongst staff and patients. These secondary cases transmitted the pneumonia to 21 hospital staff and 20 other contacts. The Ministry of Health designated TTSH and Singapore's Communicable Disease Centre as the main SARS hospitals. TTSH ceased admitting non-SARS patients in a bid to isolate the SARS patients and to free up resources.
Hospitals nationwide drew up urgent plans to monitor and contain SARS outbreaks in their hospitals. Isolation wards and negative pressure intensive care unit isolation rooms were prepared. PPE, which included disposable fluid resistant gowns, N95 masks, goggles and gloves was urgently procured.
In early April, a cluster of SARS emerged amongst staff and patients in two surgical wards in SGH, a 1700-bed teaching hospital. The index case was a non-SARS patient from TTSH who had been discharged home. He contracted SARS during his TTSH stay but later attended SGH for another complaint. During this period where clinical details of SARS were still emerging and prior to implementing of full PPE protection, this person infected 40 people, who then infected a further 44.
SARS AT SINGAPORE GENERAL HOSPITAL
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Anti-SARS Measures Implemented at Hospital Level
A hospital taskforce was set up and worked from an Operations Room. Strategies to detect, isolate and prevent the spread of SARS within the hospital and to the community were implemented. Hospital staff were educated about SARS. Each department made plans on how to manage any suspected or probable SARS patient. An alert system which reflected the extent and severity of SARS transmission was set up. Appropriate levels of administrative and medical measures and infection control practices were exercised based on the prevailing level of alert.
Infectious diseases physicians and nurses prepared directives and conducted training sessions on infection control practices. Audit teams roamed the hospital to identify and rectify errant practices.
N95 mask fitting sessions, using "fit test" 1,2 were conducted for staff. Wearing of PPE was strictly implemented for healthcare workers in triage areas, Accident and Emergency, Infectious Diseases/ isolation wards, Intensive Care Units, operating theatres and endoscopy centres.
Staff kept movement and patient contact records to facilitate contact tracing, should this become necessary. They monitored their temperatures three times each day. Those who were unwell or reported a temperature of 37.5°C or more attended the Staff Clinic for assessment. Visiting their general practitioners was discouraged in a bid to prevent community spread and simplify contact tracing should they be infected.
Hospital visitors were screened to exclude SARS incubators entering wards and infecting patients and also to facilitate contact tracing should the need arise. As the outbreak worsened, with few exceptions, no visitors were allowed since about a quarter of all SARS cases in Singapore were infected during a hospital visit. Also, there was concern that SARS could, in turn, be transmitted to the community through visitors.
Isolation wards were set up to house febrile patients, immunocompromised patients and patients with renal disease because they might not manifest the typical fever of SARS, an important herald sign, thereby posing an infection risk.
A hospital SARS website featured up-to-date bulletins, educational material and guidelines. A hotline was set up for advice. Counselling was made available since SARS infection amongst friends and colleagues was frightening to many.
SARS and its Effect on the Department of Anaesthesia
The Department of Anaesthesia had to review and modify traditional work routines in the presence of SARS. These changes, together with hospital anti-SARS measures, had wide-ranging impact on the Department.
Changes to Work Routine
Anticipating increased emergency admissions (patients were diverted to SGH from TTSH Emergency which admitted only SARS cases), elective surgery was scaled back. Five theatres were designated emergency operating theatres.
A consultant-led three-shift system was implemented for anaesthetists working in the emergency operating theatres. A modular work system, where anaesthetists worked in two ICU teams and two anaesthesia teams, each headed by a team leader, was set up. At any time, a reserve team stayed away but was contactable. This team allowed for continuity of services should another team be stricken. This modular system was possible because of the subsequent cancellation of all electives, leaving only semi-urgent and emergency work, and a very low outpatient load as patients shunned hospital visits.
The ICU team and anaesthesia team did not allow crossover of duties in their respective fields unless doctors cleared a ten-day quarantine period.
The Pain Service, Pain Clinic, premedication rounds and pre-assessment clinics were suspended at the height of the outbreak as anaesthetists were at risk, having to move about many wards, potentially causing cross-infection and being exposed to potential SARS patients.
Work practices were reviewed with emphasis on reduction of interdisciplinary and intra-disciplinary, staff-staff, patient-patient and unnecessary staffpatient contact, without compromising care. Multitasking was encouraged. Annual leave was discouraged. Important guidelines such as for transfer of high-risk patients between hospitals, departments and to operating theatres were drawn up.
Department briefings were discontinued as large gatherings were deemed unsafe. Communications were made by telephone or email, with important updates, hospital policies and instructions forwarded by team leaders. Good communication was crucial for contact tracing when some SGH patients and staff developed SARS.
Effect on Anaesthetic Practice

Wearing of PPE
Guidelines for anaesthetic practice 3 in the presence of infectious diseases were important during the SARS outbreak. During clinical work, the wearing of PPE and frequent hand washing were strictly enforced. Proper removal and disposal of used PPE was equally important. When treating suspected or probable SARS, double-gloving was used. Alcohol hand rubs were sited on every anaesthetic trolley and computer terminal.
Since SARS virus spreads through droplets and direct inoculation of secretions on to mucous membrane 4 , the protective role of the masks and goggles 5 in preventing contact with eyes, nose and mouth is crucial. Team leaders ensured attendances at mask fitting sessions and infection control briefings.
Infection Control Measures
These measures are listed in Table 2 and important ones highlighted here. Anaesthetists were discouraged from direct casual socializing especially between different departments and with staff from other institutions. Meals were provided at work locations to avoid unnecessary staff movement about the hospital.
Patients requiring surgery were screened by ward doctors for SARS symptoms, previous hospitalization at TTSH and contact history. Febrile patients and those with uncertain contact or travel history were referred to the infectious diseases physicians for advice.
Staff worked only in their assigned operating theatre to facilitate contact tracing and to minimize the number of people affected should a patient be subsequently found to have SARS. Only essential staff remained and movement in and out of the theatre was restricted. Operating theatre doors were kept closed to prevent potential contamination outside the operating theatre because of the positive pressure ventilation system. Potential sources of contamination included case notes, pens, stethoscopes and telephones. Personal effects were discouraged in the operating theatres. Staff had to shower prior to going off duty and all hospital attire disposed of in marked bags for laundry.
Unless requiring oxygen therapy, patients were given surgical masks. The use of nebulizers, oxygen delivery by Venturi masks and non-invasive positive pressure ventilation were forbidden because of the risks of viral dissemination by aerosolization. Metered dose inhalers of bronchodilators were used where appropriate.
Individual cubicles were built in the Reception and Recovery area to keep patients apart to reduce potential cross infection. A dedicated nurse to each patient prevented cross-infection. PPE was changed between cases. When the recovery area reached its capacity, postoperative patients were cared for by the anaesthetist in their respective operating theatres and the list could not proceed. This had implications on choice of anaesthetic technique and efficiency.
A remote site Isolation Operating Theatre was used for surgery in patients where SARS could not be ruled out, patients with renal disease and immunocompromised patients. Extreme precautions against infection included wearing powered air purifying respirator (PAPR) throughout the case, staff having to shower and change after each case and thorough operating theatre disinfection between cases (since the SARS virus is known to survive on inanimate objects for up to 24 hours). Patients were recovered in the theatre instead of the recovery area before returning directly to the ward, using designated corridors and lifts.
Equipment
The Department felt that in addition to wearing PPE, using powered air purifying respirators (PAPR) 6 (Jupiter™ 3M, Bracknell, U.K. and Proflow™ Scott Health and Safety Oy, Vaasa, Finland) during airway manipulations gave increased protection since suspected or probable SARS patients pose an extreme hazard because of high viral loads 7 . PAPR were also used when surgery involved power tools producing aerosolization. Putting on the PAPR rendered the user clumsy, impaired vision and hearing, making communication difficult. These had implications during urgent situations. Maintenance and cleaning were also important concerns.
Single-use equipment was used where possible. Disposable breathing circuits were changed after each case. High efficiency bacterial and viral hydrophobic filters (Barrierbac "S"™ Mallinckrodt, Mirandola, Italy) were sited at the patient end and on the expiratory limbs of the breathing circuits. Soda lime was changed between cases in the Isolation Operating Theatre.
All sharps were meticulously disposed of. Used airway adjuncts and suction catheters were disposed of in ziploc bags for decontamination or disposal.
Equipment and surface cleaning using 1% sodium hypochlorite, detergent and 70% ethyl alcohol were in accordance with World Health Organization (WHO) Cleaning Master Document.
Anaesthetic Work Processes
Our anaesthetic practice favoured, where appropriate, the use of regional techniques to avoid airway instrumentation. During general anaesthesia, intuba-tion, suctioning and extubation, where coughing occurred were performed with PAPR protection.
Short-acting anaesthetic agents were used to shorten recovery time so that patients could return to wards early, minimizing contact with staff and other patients.
The practice whereby the next patient on the list was brought to the anaesthetic room to be screened and have an intravenous line sited while awaiting induction was not allowed as a precaution against cross-infection. Turn-around time was increased.
Education and Training
Anaesthesia training became an early casualty and "e-learning" with web-based learning hosted on the Department web-site was implemented for new anaesthetic doctors. Many of the junior doctors were sent to run hard-pressed and under-staffed sites such as isolation wards and the Accident and Emergency Unit.
Practical skills training for trainees may have suffered since airway procedures were preferentially performed by the more senior person. When PAPR was used throughout a case, case discussion was hampered.
Outcome of Measures Taken
In SGH, 24 healthcare workers, including two doctors were infected. Two succumbed. Subsequent strict implementation of infection control measures saw no new SARS cases. No anaesthesia, intensive care or operating theatre staff in SGH were infected despite having managed SARS patients, especially atypical presenters who subsequently manifested clinically.
A review of incident-reporting records in the Department showed that despite new and unfamiliar measures being adopted and alterations made to our anaesthetic practices during the outbreak, with some resultant inefficiencies, there were no anaesthetic related adverse incidents reported during this period. On the contrary, many anaesthetists felt they exercised even greater caution in their practice with these measures implemented.
In September 2003, the infection control precautions maintained by SGH after the SARS outbreak ended were successfully tested when the admission and management of an undiagnosed SARS patient did not result in any transmission in SGH.
DISCUSSION
SARS, a highly infectious atypical pneumonia, is caused by a new RNA enveloped coronavirus isolated from respiratory secretions of SARS patients 8, 9 . It is diagnosed based on WHO case definitions 10 (Table 1) . Many healthcare workers have been infected 11 . In Canada, at least three anaesthetists and an intensivist were infected 7 . Of the 251 cases of probable SARS, 109 were healthcare workers 12 -high fever (>38°C) AND -cough or breathing difficulty AND one or more of the following exposures during the 10 days prior to onset of symptoms: -close contact 2 with a person who is a suspect or probable case of SARS; -history of travel, to an area with recent local transmission of SARS -residing in an area with recent local transmission of SARS 2. A person with an unexplained acute respiratory illness resulting in death after 1 November 2002 1 , but on whom no autopsy has been performed AND one or more of the following exposures during the 10 days prior to onset of symptoms: -close contact 2 with a person who is a suspect or probable case of SARS; -history of travel to an area with recent local transmission of SARS -residing in an area with recent local transmission of SARS 14, 16 . Fever may be absent in elderly patients and subclinical infections have been described. "Superspreaders" who carry high viral loads exist 17 . The nonspecific onset and incubation of up to ten or eleven days favour community transmission 18 . Patients and suspected cases should wear N95 masks as precautions against droplet infection transmission and be promptly isolated in negative pressure isolation facilities.
Heightened alertness of hospital staff, intense public education, together with measures to limit community spread of the disease, including efficient contact tracing and quarantine, were essential for limiting SARS transmission 4 . The long-term sequelae of SARS is unclear and will require further surveillance 17 .
The SARS outbreak had a major impact on our department as all aspects of anaesthetic practice were directly affected by SARS precautions. These ranged from the need for thorough patient assessment preoperatively to rule out SARS, airway management and clearing of secretions, postoperative care, analgesia provision by the pain service, resuscitation and intensive care, to the efficient throughput of patients through a theatre list.
Many of these changes to anaesthetic practice highlight the role of imagination and foresight in making the best of a difficult situation. New plans were made and refined as the situation changed. Staff were sympathetic to considerable inconvenience and unavoidable inefficiencies.
Staff and non SARS patients had to be protected from SARS. The balance between service provision and risk of health workers being exposed had to be carefully considered, since all patients were presumed to have SARS. Work which placed anaesthetists at unnecessary risk ceased or was modified, including cessation of the Pain Service and premedication rounds. Regional techniques for anaesthesia were used if possible and PAPR was worn during airway procedures.
Many procedures with which anaesthetists are involved with such as endotracheal intubation, airway suctioning, bronchial toilet, bronchoscopy and cardiopulmonary resuscitation 17, 18 posed very high risk of disease transmission when managing suspected and probable SARS patients. The highest level of PPE had to be used.
The routine practices of asepsis and infection prevention in the operating theatres were expanded from the prevention of wound infections to protecting the lives of staff and patients by the implementation of decontamination procedures and cross infection prevention.
The Isolation OT, where high level of infectious disease precautions were undertaken were made available for surgery on patients where SARS could not be excluded. These patients were managed with great caution. Table 2 summarizes the infection control practices adopted by the department during the SARS outbreak when anaesthetizing patients.
SARS exacted a financial toll. An estimated A$185 million was spent nationwide on infrastructure, medical supplies and implementing work processes during the outbreak. In SGH, about A$18 million was spent on PPE. Cancelled elective lists made an impact on the department finances in terms of revenue from some private patients. The cost implications on hospital finances consequent to reduced bed capacity to cater for infection control practices, infrastructure alterations, urgent purchases of disposables and equipment are not insignificant. A predicted 18% fall in revenue in 2003 has been made.
There are lessons to be learnt from this epidemic. SARS has been eradicated but the crisis is a wakeup call for hospitals and healthcare workers. Experts have predicted a SARS resurgence during the northern hemisphere winter (2003) (2004) . All hospitals should prepare contingency plans (Table 3 ) and plan for mobilization of human, logistic and infrastructure resources (Table 4 ) in the event the virus resurfaces or new infectious outbreaks occur. Inadequate isolation and ICU facilities was a major problem many countries faced during this outbreak and this should be addressed. Anaesthetic departments should also consider maintaining a supply of PPE on standby for use should any suspicious cases appear.
Infection control practices must be strengthened, especially the basic principles of handwashing, gloving and degloving, hygiene practices and selfmonitoring.
Medical personnel worldwide should continue to be vigilant, since practices causing inconvenience are usually the first to be discarded. They must familiarize themselves with the symptoms and signs of SARS and follow the advice available at the WHO web-site (http://www.who.int/csr/sars/guidelines/en/) or (http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/clinicians.htm), the CDC website. An even higher index of suspicion is required as new generations of SARS infections may have blurred epidemiological links to known probable cases 19 . International collaboration should also be encouraged.
At the height of the crisis, good communication, transparency and highly visible efforts to protect staff were crucial for morale. Having clear direction in administrative issues, clinical pathways, and strict adherence to guidelines and policies were needed to prevent confusion. Resolve was required to implement unpopular mandates. Easy access to authority and leadership was imperative. Though cost was an important issue, this was never bargained against safety during this period.
Finally 
